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(TRANS)FORMING THE PROVOCATION 
DEFENSE 
Morgan Tilleman∗
“My family, some who are with me here tonight, always loved and supported Angie.  
We understood that she was born in a boy’s body but she was a woman. So many 
transgender people do not receive that love, acceptance and support.” 
 
—Monica Zapata1
I. GREELEY, COLORADO: JULY 17, 2009 
 
Sometime in 2008, Angie Zapata, then eighteen, met a thirty-two-year-
old man on a social networking site called Moco Space,2 and they began to 
chat.3  Later that year, in mid-July, she met that man, Allen Ray Andrade, 
in person for a date.4  A few days later, Angie’s sister, Monica Zapata, 
found Angie’s body in Angie’s apartment, stiff and “covered with a 
bloodstained blanket.”5  She had been beaten to death with fists and a fire 
extinguisher.6
 
∗ JD Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2011.  BA, Indiana University, 
2007.  Thanks to my family for putting up with drafting at Thanksgiving and for their 
unflagging support of everything I do.  Special thanks to Terra White and Kirk Watkins for 
their editorial assistance and thoughtful comments. 
 
1 Angie Zapata’s Story Honored by Family and GLAAD, GLAADBLOG (April 29, 2009), 
http://glaadblog.org/2009/04/29/angie-zapatas-story-honored-by-family-and-glaad-2/.  This 
Comment is for Angie Zapata and for her family, whose strength, love, and character have 
inspired and awed me throughout the project of writing it. 
2 Sharon Dunn, Andrade: Stunned Victim or Homophobic Killer?, GREELEY TRIB. (Apr. 
17, 2009), http://www.greeleytribune.com/article/20090417/NEWS/904169867.  
3 DeeDee Correll, Colo. Transgender Woman’s Slaying is Tried as Hate Crime, L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2009, at A3. 
4 Id. 
5 Melanie Asmar, Who Was Angie Zapata?  Her Murderer’s Trial Didn’t Tell the Whole 
Story, DENVER WESTWORD (May 28, 2009), http://www.westword.com/2009-05-
28/news/who-was-angie-zapata-her-murderer-s-trial-didn-t-tell-the-whole-story/. 
6 Dan Frosch, Murder and Hate Verdict in Transgender Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 
2009, at A20. 
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Angie Zapata was not an ordinary homicide victim, however.  She was 
“a teenage girl in every sense but the biological one,” according to her 
sister.7  When Angie was at her sister’s store, men “would make excuses to 
hover [around her],” drawn by her “stunning” appearance.8  Angie, who 
was born Justin David Zapata, began presenting her gender as female full-
time in high school.9  Her family and friends supported her as she grew 
towards adulthood as a woman.10  Angie Zapata was transgender, and the 
trial of Allen Andrade, her killer, revolved around whether that fact 
partially justified her murder.11
II. THEORIES OF THE ZAPATA CASE 
 
Less than a week after Angie Zapata’s death, police in Colorado 
arrested Allen Andrade when he was found using Monica Zapata’s car and 
credit card.12  During questioning after his arrest, Andrade told police “he 
had attacked [Angie] upon discovering that she was biologically a man” 
following sexual activity with her.13
After their initial meeting in person, Angie spent three days with 
Andrade before leaving to watch her sister’s children on July 16, 2008.
  Melanie Asmar filled in the gaps 
between Angie and Allen Andrade’s first meeting and Angie’s brutal 
murder. 
14  
According to his statements to the police, Andrade spent that day by 
himself in Angie’s apartment, where he increasingly suspected that she was 
not, in fact, “female.”15  He claimed in the affidavit that he forced the issue 
with Angie that night, and that she responded, “I am all woman.”16  He 
claimed he asked for proof, which she refused; he then reached for her 
crotch, where he felt Angie’s penis.17  According to the affidavit, Andrade 
responded by punching Angie until she fell to the floor, at which point he 
hit her over the head with a fire extinguisher twice.18
 
7 Correll, supra note 
  After she fell to the 
3, at A3. 
8 Id. 
9 Asmar, supra note 5. 
10 Id. 
11 For an overview of the theories advanced by both the prosecution and defense see 
infra text accompanying notes 21–30. 
12 Sharon Dunn, Key Question: When Did Andrade Know?, GREELEY TRIB., Apr. 16, 
2009, at A1. 
13 Frosch, supra note 6, at A20. 
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floor, Andrade covered her body with a blanket.19  Then, because he “heard 
gurgling sounds” coming from Zapata, he returned and struck her face with 
the fire extinguisher one more time.20
The brutal details of the crime were clear, but prosecutors and defense 
attorneys suggested very different motives for the killing of Angie Zapata.  
Prosecutors painted a picture of a brutal killer motivated by hatred and 
prejudice who plotted the death of a transgender woman.
 
21  Given that 
Andrade had confessed to police, his defense team chose to argue that he 
had acted “in the heat of passion” upon unexpectedly discovering that 
Angie had male genitalia.22  In the words of Bradley Martin, one of 
Andrade’s lawyers, “You will hear him say, ‘It happened so fast and so 
hard, I couldn’t stop [the beating].’”23  Andrade’s lawyers based their 
defense on Andrade’s sudden, unexpected awareness of Angie Zapata’s 
anatomical sex.  One of his attorneys, Annette Kundelius, told potential 
jurors at jury selection, “When [Andrade] learned Angie was in fact Justin, 
he immediately reacted.  He had been deceived, and he reacted.  He reacted, 
he lost control, he was outside of himself.”24
Prosecutors argued that Andrade did not learn that Angie was 
transgender in the manner he claimed; Weld County Deputy District 
Attorney Brandi Nieto told potential jurors, “You’re going to learn the 
defendant knew for quite some time that Angie was biologically male.”
  Andrade’s defense relied on 
two critical points: first, that Angie “deceived” him about her “real” sex or 
gender; and second, that this “deception” reasonably caused Allen Andrade 
to lose control. 
25  
Instead, prosecutors argued, Andrade learned that Zapata was transgender 
more than a day earlier when he went to traffic court with her.  There, the 
clerk referred to Zapata as Justin, not Angie.26  Pointing out that the name 
ought to have made Zapata’s transgender status obvious, Nieto concluded, 
“[Killing Zapata] was not a snap decision.”27
 
19 Id. 
  Prosecutors painted Andrade 
as animated by his prejudice, transphobia, and homophobia.  At trial, they 
20 Id. 
21 Monte Whaley, Transgender Victim, Man Had Hours of Texts, Talk, DENVER POST, 
Apr. 17, 2009, at B-02. 
22 Jim Spellman, Transgender Murder, Hate Crime Conviction a First, CNN.COM (Apr. 
22, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/04/22/transgender.slaying.trial/index.html. 
23 Whaley, supra note 21, at B-02. 
24 Dunn, supra note 12, at A1. 
25 Id. 
26 Correll, supra note 3, at A3. 
27 Id. 
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entered transcripts of jail phone calls between Andrade and an unidentified 
woman, where he told her, “It is not like I went up to a schoolteacher and 
shot her in the head or killed a straight law-abiding citizen.”28  In another 
phone conversation admitted into evidence, Andrade said, “Gay things need 
to die.”29  Capturing the theory of bigotry put forth by the prosecution, 
Nieto summarized the case: “[Andrade] makes it clear there is a difference 
between killing someone who’s homosexual and someone who’s not.  He 
knew for some time [that Angie] was transgender, and he brutally killed her 
because of it.”30
After hearing both theories, twelve Colorado jurors took only two 
hours to convict Allen Andrade of first-degree murder.
 
31  This is the first 
known case in which an “anti-transgender murder was prosecuted as a hate 
crime,” according to Crystal Middlestadt of the Colorado Anti-Violence 
Program.32  The hate crime enhancement to Andrade’s conviction added 
three years to his sentence, a first anywhere in the United States.33  Zealous 
prosecutors, strong evidence (including a confession), and a sympathetic 
victim34 combined in the aftermath of Angie Zapata’s death to see justice 
done.  The Andrade trial might suggest that the law, as written, will protect 
transgender people—especially now that the Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes 
Prevention Act of 2009 is federal law.35
 
28 Frosch, supra note 
  In many cases, however, the 
evidence will not be as strong.   
6, at A20. 
29 Id. 
30 Dunn, supra note 2. 
31 Sharon Dunn, Andrade Guilty, Sentenced to Life in Murder of Angie Zapata, GREELEY 
TRIB. (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.greeleytribune.com/article/20090423/NEWS/904229934. 
32 Karen Auge, A Milestone in Battling Hate Crimes, DENVER POST, Apr. 23, 2009, 
at A-06. 
33 Monte Whaley, Lifetime in Prison in Transgender Death, DENVER POST, Apr. 23, 
2009, at A–01. 
34 Angie Zapata’s family was a constant presence in the courtroom and media, mourning 
the loss of a daughter or sister—and all of them were supportive of her life as a transgender 
woman.  For Maria Zapata’s reaction to the verdict, see Dunn, supra note 31 (quoting from 
Zapata’s address to the judge after the verdict).  For the reaction from Angie Zapata’s 
mother, family, and friends, see Asmar, supra note 5 (recounting interviews with family and 
friends of Angie Zapata in the aftermath of the trial). 
35 Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
84, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009) (the “Matthew Shepard Act”) (providing for federal assistance in 
cases involving bias-motivated acts).  Under the new law, the federal government has 
significantly enhanced powers to intervene in hate crimes prosecution. 
The hate crimes legislation would give the federal government authority to prosecute violent 
crimes of antigay bias when local authorities failed to act.  It would also allocate $5 million a 
year to the Justice Department to provide assistance to local communities in investigating hate 
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Angie’s murder and Allen Andrade’s trial are an exception; many 
transgender people die alone and their killers are never found.  In 2008, the 
Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation documented twenty-one 
killings of transgender people.36  Angie’s murder is notable only for the fact 
that it was solved.  Other victims have not been so lucky.  In February 
2008, Simmie Williams, Jr. was shot to death in Fort Lauderdale, Florida; 
Jaylynn L. Namauu was stabbed to death in Hawaii in July; Nikhia “Nikki” 
Williams was shot and left to die in a dumpster behind her house in 
Louisville, Kentucky, just over a month later.37  These names join a long 
and growing list of almost 300 transgender people whose killings have been 
documented by Transgender Day of Remembrance since 1970.38
III. DEFINING TRANSGENDER 
  The 
experiences of transgender people across America suggest that more needs 
to be done to protect them. 
Some simplification, however fraught with political and definitional 
difficulty, is necessary for the purposes of this Comment.  To begin with, it 
is important to recognize the difference between sex and gender.  Relatively 
standard definitions of both make the distinction clear: “Sex refers to the 
classification of being either male or female and is usually determined by 
the external genitalia.  Gender refers to the culturally determined 
behavioral, social, and psychological traits that are typically associated 
with being male or female.”39
 
crimes, a process that can sometimes strain police resources.  And it would allow the department 
to assist in the inquiry and local prosecution if requested. 
  While not capturing the infinite complexity 
Carl Hulse, House, 281–146, Votes to Define Antigay Attacks as Hate Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, 
October 9, 2009, at A1 (commenting on the version of the bill passed by the House of 
Representatives, which substantively reflects the language eventually signed into law).  It 
remains to be seen whether or not the Justice Department will use its newfound power to 
intervene in hate crimes prosecution. 
36 The Angie Zapata Murder: Violence Against Transgender People Resource Kit, GAY 
AND LESBIAN ALLIANCE AGAINST DEFAMATION, http://www.glaad.org/page.aspx?pid=572 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2010). 
37 Statistics and Other Info, TRANSGENDER DAY OF REMEMBRANCE  (Sept. 13, 2010), 
http://www.transgenderdor.org/?page_id=192. 
38 Id. 
39 MILDRED L. BROWN & CHLOE ANNE ROUNSLEY, TRUE SELVES 19 (1996).  Academics 
and clinicians in the field have also developed much more nuanced definitions of both sex 
and gender.  Julie A. Greenberg begins with eight factors, including “[g]enetic or 
chromosomal sex” and “[h]ormonal sex.”  Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: 
Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 270–291 
(1999) (exploring the physiological and psychological variations of sex and gender, 
particularly in their relation to the law). 
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of the human condition, these definitions will at least clarify the 
understanding of what transgender means for the remainder of this 
Comment. 
There is a broad spectrum of gender identity, much of which falls well 
outside the subject of this Comment.40  Transgender, however, is often used 
as an “umbrella term” for those with gender identities outside of simply 
male/man or female/woman.41  This Comment is concerned with a discrete 
subset of gender possibilities outside the norm: people who present as a 
gender that does not fully conform with their anatomical sex characteristics.  
For example, Angie Zapata presented as a female but had male sex organs.  
Similarly, some trans men present as male but have female sex organs.  Not 
all transgender people desire to have sex reassignment surgery—which 
reshapes the external genitalia to conform with an individual’s gender 
identity—and thus there is a community which will persist in not 
conforming to the gender/sex expectations of a heteronormative society.  
Even for those transgender people who do have sex reassignment surgery or 
surgeries, many non-sex characteristics—such as facial shape, voice, and 
stature—are not changed by surgery.42  Angie Zapata was a pre-operative 
transsexual because she had not undergone sex reassignment surgery before 
she was murdered; she was also transgender, and would remain so after any 
surgery.43  Although scholars, journalists, and commentators use different 
terms in referring to individuals whose gender presentation does not match 
their anatomical sex, this Comment will use the term transgender to signify 
all people whose presented gender (clothing, hair, carriage, etc.) does not 
conform to their anatomical sex at birth.44
 
40 In addition to transgender people who feel strongly that their physical sex does not 
match their gender identity—whether transgender women or transgender men—there are 
also numerous other “others.”  To consider only a few examples, there are intersex people, 
who identify as neither fully male nor fully female, and people with additional chromosomes 
beyond XX or XY.  For a more in-depth discussion of the intersection of law and gender, see 
Greenberg, supra note 
 
39, at 270–78. 
41 Jillian Todd Weiss, The Gender Caste System: Identity, Privacy, and 
Heteronormativity, 10 LAW & SEXUALITY 123, 142 (2001). 
42 Id.  Professor Weiss puts it eloquently: “An identity cannot be created by surgical 
means.”  Id. 
43 See generally id. at 142–43. 
44 Some cited sources differ in their terminology.  While the distinctions and 
commonalities between trans men or trans women, transgender people, and transsexuals are 
important to much scholarship on gender identity, the legal argument made here applies to 
everyone whose gender identity differs in some way from their anatomical sex.  References 
in quoted sources which use other terminology are read here to include the broadest possible 
range of subjects, corresponding with this Comment’s definition of transgender. 
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IV. THE PROVOCATION DEFENSE 
Traditionally, the provocation defense has been used by defendants 
charged with murder in situations where it is understandable that they might 
be in an abnormal mental state.45
In essence, the provocation defense is simple: when a defendant kills 
in the heat of passion, what would normally be considered murder—absent 
mental turmoil—is mitigated to manslaughter.  The defense is generally 
justified by looking at the mental state of the actor.
  This Part will explore the traditional 
application of the provocation defense before examining the development 
of the gay panic defense as a specific form of the provocation defense.  It 
will then discuss how the gay panic framework has been extended to cases 
with transgender murder victims. 
46  Killing with 
premeditation is found to be more morally offensive than killing without 
premeditation or killing in a reason-clouding rage.47  To use the common 
law provocation defense, the defendant must show that the killing was 
motivated by legally adequate provocation, which did in fact cause a heat of 
passion, which had not receded by the time of the killing.48  These common 
law features are incorporated into most state provocation statutes.49  
Generally, the legal adequacy of provocation is determined using the 
reasonable person standard, under which provocation is “considered legally 
adequate if the reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would have been 
provoked into a heat of passion.”50
The Model Penal Code (MPC) diverges from the objectivity of the 
reasonable person standard to incorporate consideration of the defendant’s 
subjective mental state via the extreme emotional disturbance test.  The 
MPC prescribes that “a homicide which would otherwise be murder is 
[mitigated if] committed under the influence of an extreme mental or 





45 The full history and theory of the provocation defense is well outside the scope of this 
Comment.  For an overview, see generally Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A 
Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1982). 
  The MPC offers this gloss: “The reasonableness of such 
explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in 
46 See generally id. 
47 Id. at 436–43. 
48 Robert B. Mison, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as 
Insufficient Provocation, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 133, 140 (1992).  See generally WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW §15.2(b), at 777 (4th ed. 2003). 
49 Mison, supra note 48, at 140. 
50 See Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 500 (2008). 
51 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (2001). 
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the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.”52
A. GAY PANIC: A MODEL? 
  
Under both the prevailing reasonable person standard and the MPC 
approach, however, the ultimate arbiter of adequate provocation is the fact-
finder, not the defendant. 
In a groundbreaking comment published in 1992, Robert B. Mison 
outlined an argument for judicial invalidation of what was then a frequently 
employed variation of the provocation defense: the so-called homosexual 
advance defense.53  He asked a simple question: “Should a nonviolent 
sexual advance in and of itself constitute sufficient provocation to incite a 
reasonable man to lose his self-control and kill in the heat of passion?”54
Mison looked first at the words of judges.  He recounted the story of 
Broward County, Florida Circuit Judge Daniel Futch, who presided over a 
criminal trial arising out of the beating of Daniel Wan by a group of men 
who called Wan “faggot” while kicking him and “[throwing] him against a 
moving vehicle.”
  
The stories he recounted stretch the outer limit of plausibility. 
55  At a pretrial hearing, Judge Futch “jokingly asked the 
prosecuting attorney, ‘That’s a crime now, to beat up a homosexual?’”56  
Later, Mison turns from judges to criminals.  He recounts the story of 
Schick v. State, where a younger man, hitchhiking with an older man, asks 
the older man where he can find someone to perform oral sex.57  The older 
man offers to do it and the two buy cigarettes together before 
consummating the act in a dark baseball field.58  Then, the young man 
“kicks [the older man], stomps on him, takes his money, and leaves the 
victim to die.”59  After a trial where the younger man claimed that the older 
man’s “homosexual advance” had caused him to lose all self-control, the 
jury found the defendant guilty only of voluntary manslaughter.60
 
52 Id. 
  Mison 
53 See Mison, supra note 48, at 136. 
54 Id. at 133–34. 
55 Id. at 163 (citing Suzanne Bryant, Nat’l Lesbian & Gay Law Ass’n, Remarks before 
the A.B.A. Judicial Conduct Subcommittee (Sept. 22, 1989)). 
56 Id. 
57 Mison, supra note 48, at 134–35; see Schick v. State, 570 N.E.2d 918, 921–22 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1991). 
58 Schick, 570 N.E.2d at 921–22. 
59 Mison, supra note 48, at 135. 
60 Id. (citing Schick, 570 N.E.2d at 922). 
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documented several more cases61 in which a provocation defense based on 
homosexual advances was allowed—including one where the evidence 
suggested that the defendant had intended to rob gay men,62 and another in 
which “homosexual paraphernalia” belonging to the victim, found under 
lock and key away from the crime scene, was admitted to substantiate a 
homosexual provocation defense.63
The basic legal claim underlying the homosexual panic defense 
common at the time Mison wrote, almost twenty years ago, is as follows: a 
reasonable man
 
64 would be insulted and enraged by a nonviolent 
homosexual advance and his anger would constitute legally sufficient 
provocation.65
In seeking to avail himself of the provocation defense the defendant hopes that the 
typical American juror—a product of homophobic and heterocentric American 
society—will evaluate the homosexual victim and homosexual overture with feelings 
of fear, revulsion, and hatred.  The defendant’s goal is to convince the jury that his 
reaction was only a reflection of this visceral societal reaction; the reaction of a 
“reasonable man.”
  Mison succinctly diagnoses the defendant’s goal in using the 
homosexual advance defense: 
66
When Mison was writing, the connection between the homosexual 
panic defense and widespread revulsion and bigotry in larger society was 
practically undeniable; since that time, however, societal attitudes towards 
homosexuality have been slowly changing.
 
67  There has also been an 
outpouring of legal scholarship that has been almost uniformly critical of 
the legal and moral underpinnings of the homosexual panic defense.68
 
61 See generally People v. Saldivar, 497 N.E.2d 1138 (Ill. 1986); Schick, 570 N.E.2d at 
918; Commonwealth v. Doucette, 462 N.E.2d 1084 (Mass. 1984); Mison, supra note 
  
48, at 
167–70 (citing Mills v. Shepherd, 445 F. Supp. 1231 (W.D.N.C. 1978)). 
62 Mison, supra note 48, at 167–68 (citing Mills, 445 F. Supp. at 1231). 
63 Saldivar, 497 N.E.2d at 1138. 
64 The defendant in a homosexual panic defense situation is almost inevitably male; in 
1992, Mison failed to find a single example of a reputed lesbian panic defense.  Mison, 
supra note 48, at 135 n.7. 
65 Id. at 155–58. 
66 Id. at 158. 
67 See ALISON G. KELEHER & ERIC R.A.N. SMITH, EXPLAINING THE GROWING SUPPORT 
FOR GAY AND LESBIAN EQUALITY SINCE 1990, at 1 (2008), http://www.polsci.ucsb.edu/ 
faculty/ smith/equality.pdf.  “[F]rom 1973 through 1991, 70 to 78 percent of the public 
thought that sexual relations between two adults of the same sex were always wrong.  Then 
acceptance of gays and lesbians began to grow.  By 2004, the number saying that 
homosexual relations were always wrong had fallen to 57 percent.”  Id. 
68 See, e.g., Mison, supra note 48; Christina Pei-Lin Chen, Comment, Provocation’s 
Privileged Desire: The Provocation Doctrine, “Homosexual Panic,” and the Non-Violent 
Unwanted Sexual Advance Defense, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 195 (2000); Kara S. 
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Noting the improvement in attitudes towards homosexuals as well as 
potential problems with a ban on the gay panic defense,69 one prominent 
legal scholar has even advocated against attempts to restrict use of the gay 
panic defense in the courtroom.70  Additionally, thirty states and the District 
of Columbia have enacted hate crimes laws that explicitly sanction felonies 
committed in part because of bias against homosexuality71—now joined by 
the federal government.72
B. TRANS PANIC: PUTTING THE “T” IN MITIGATION 
  The increasing intervention by state and federal 
law against entrenched homophobic violence has not, however, led to the 
disappearance of anti-gay violence or the killing of homosexuals.  If 
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals are not safe despite an improving legal 
environment, what hope do transgender people have? 
While the gay panic defense has a history dating back at least to the 
early twentieth century,73 documentation of murders of transgender people 
date back only to the 1970s.74  As transgender people have become 
increasingly visible, their presence in courts has become more marked.  
Courts, which only recently struggled to incorporate the possibility of same-
sex attraction, must now also handle transgender victims and defendants 
claiming they killed in a state of trans panic.75
 
Suffredini, Comment, Pride and Prejudice: The Homosexual Panic Defense, 21 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 279, 2001.  But see Joshua Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill 
“Homosexual” Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the 
“Reasonable Man” Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726 (1995) (responding to 
Mison and arguing that Mison’s arguments suggest a wholesale repeal of the provocation 
doctrine rather than merely a rejection of the homosexual panic defense, as Mison argued). 
  In many ways, the trans 
69 See infra text accompanying notes 181–182; Mison, supra note 48, at 174–78. 
70 Lee, supra note 50, at 521–57. 
71 Nat’l Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Hate Crime Laws in the U.S., July 14, 2009, 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue_maps/hate_crimes_7_09_color.pdf. 
72 Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L.  
No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009). 
73 Lee, supra note 50, at 482–83. 
74 TRANSGENDER DAY OF REMEMBRANCE, supra note 36.  Perhaps the first case to 
generate popular interest is the murder of Brandon Teena, who was killed by two men 
accused of raping the trans man.  Rogers Worthington, Deadly Deception; Teena Brandon’s 
Double Life May Have Led to a Triple Murder, CHI. TRIB., January 17, 1994, at TEMPO-1.  
Teena’s death inspired the film Boys Don’t Cry.  Roger Ebert, Boys Don’t Cry, 
ROGEREBERT.COM (Oct. 22, 1999), http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/ 
article?AID=/19991022/REVIEWS/910220302/1023. 
75 In addition to Angie Zapata, the murders of Gwen Araujo and Lateisha Green attracted 
significant media attention.  See Kate Linthicum, Conviction in Killing of Transgender 
Woman, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2009, at A11.  See generally Wyatt Buchanan, Transgender 
Killings an Investigative Quagmire, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 15, 2005, at A1.  There are 
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panic defense is similar to gay panic; both assert that the defendant had his 
heterosexuality or masculinity so existentially challenged by the victim that 
the defendant acted without reason.76  Trans panic defenses add an 
additional claim, however, which is critical to this Comment’s analysis: 
they assert that the victim misled the defendant.  Describing the trans panic 
defense used in the Gwen Araujo77
Above all, defense counsel argued that Araujo’s commission of “sexual fraud” 
constituted sufficient provocation . . . .  While burying Araujo, one defendant said that 
“he could not believe that someone could ever be so deceitful.  By being deceitful, he 
meant having sex with someone who thought it [sic] was a woman, not simply 
presenting as a woman when the person was actually a man.”
 trial, Victoria L. Steinberg writes: 
78
This closely parallels the claims made by Allen Andrade in his defense—
that he was shocked by the “revelation” of Zapata’s anatomical sex. 
 
In both the Aruajo and Zapata cases, the defendants claimed they had 
been deceived about the victim’s “sex.”  In his trial for murdering Angie 
Zapata, Andrade’s defense team told the jury, “He had been deceived, and 
he reacted.”79  Andrade claimed he was convinced that Angie was female 
until immediately before he killed her; when he learned about her 
anatomical sex, he flew into a rage.  Gwen Aruajo’s killers made similar 
claims, asserting that they were deceived.  One of the accused’s lawyers 
told the jury, “This crime didn’t occur because Mike [the defendant] had a 
bias.  It happened because of the discovery of what Eddie [Gwen] had 
done . . . .  This is a case that tells a story about . . . the tragic results when 
that deception and betrayal were discovered [by the defendant].”80
 
undoubtedly other trials (given that the violent killing of almost 300 transgender people has 
been documented in the last forty years) but many, if not most, escape meaningful media 
attention. 
  In both 
76 For an overview of the gay panic defense, see supra text accompanying notes 53–66.  
For an overview of the trans panic defense, see Victoria L. Steinberg, Book Review, A Heat 
of Passion Offense: Emotions and Bias in “Trans Panic” Mitigation Claims, 25 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 499, 520 (2005) (reviewing MARTHA NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY 
(2004)). 
77 Gwen Araujo was murdered in 2002 after a group of young men with whom she had 
engaged in oral sex discovered that she was anatomically male.  She was supposedly beaten 
with “a can and a skillet” and strangled to death.  See generally Kelly St. John, Defense in 
Araujo Trial Gives Final Argument, S.F. CHRON., June 3, 2004, at B1. 
78 Steinberg, supra note 76, at 520 (citing Memorandum of Law from Michael P. 
Thorman to Alameda Super. Ct. in Support of Motion to Set Aside Hate Clause Allegation 
and Information Pursuant to Penal Code § 995, Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 
7–9, People v. Magidson, No. H-33728C (Super Ct. Cal. June 25, 2003)).  Here, Steinberg 
quotes from the defense attorney’s written assertion of the trans panic defense. 
79 Dunn, supra note 12, at A1. 
80 Vicki Haddock, ‘Gay Panic’ Defense in Araujo Case, S.F. CHRON., May 16, 2004, at 
E1. 
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cases, the defense suggested that the killer thought he was intimate with a 
woman/female.  Thus, the revelation that, from the defendant’s perspective 
at least, they had been intimate with a trans woman—decidedly not a person 
with the anatomical sex in which heterosexuality dictated that the defendant 
be interested—would be shocking. 
Existing legal scholarship on trans panic defenses in murder cases is 
scant.  The literature criticizing trans panic defenses includes a book review 
which argues that courts should not give jury instructions based on the trans 
panic defense81 and a student comment calling for the legislative abolition 
of gay and trans panic defenses in California.82  On the other hand, one 
commentator argues that “sexual misrepresentation,” including the 
situations involving transgender people considered here, should constitute 
adequate provocation for the provocation defense to apply.83  Given that 
trans panic defenses are already being asserted in criminal courtrooms and 
that many thousands of Americans identify as transgender,84
In its present form, the trans panic defense is often asserted 
explicitly—the defendant argues that he was extraordinarily provoked and 
that he should be punished more leniently because of his state of mind.
 it is important 
for the criminal law to keep pace with cultural change. 
85  
Other defendants do not explicitly argue for leniency; they instead seek to 
impeach the victim’s humanity and diminish the sympathy that jurors feel 
for the victim.86
 
81 Steinberg, supra note 
  The trans panic defense strategy, whether explicit or 
76, at 520. 
82 David L. Annicchiarico, Comment, Consistency, Integrity and Equal Justice: A 
Proposal to Rid California Law of the LGBT Panic Defense, 5 DUKEMINIER AWARDS 121 
(2006).  Annicchiarico addresses the trans panic defense in issuing a compelling call for a 
legislative ban on defenses related to “LGBT panic” in California.  He references the murder 
of Gwen Aruajo but does not make a distinction between trans and gay panic—nor does his 
argument address assertions of deception related to sex or gender by defendants. 
83 Bradford Bigler, Sexually Provoked: Recognizing Sexual Misrepresentation as 
Adequate Provocation, 53 UCLA L. REV. 783 (2006). 
84 Olyslager and Conway estimate that up to 1 in 500 people are transsexual and 1 in 100 
people are transgender.  In the United States, this would indicate 600,000 transsexual people 
and 3,000,000 transgender people.  FEMKE OLYSLAGER & LYNN CONWAY, ON THE 
CALCULATION OF THE PREVALENCE OF TRANSSEXUALISM 23 (2007), http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/ 
people/conway/TS/Prevalence/Reports/Prevalence%20of%20Transsexualism.pdf. 
85 This is the argument made in the Araujo case.  See generally Haddock, supra note 80, 
at E1.  
86 Allen Andrade’s defense team utilized this tactic, referring to Angie Zapata by her 
legal male name, Justin.  Dunn, supra note 2.  This less explicit appeal to juror bias is a 
major worry for Professor Lee, whose work suggests that defense lawyers will increasingly 
use these “coded” arguments if an explicit provocation defense is denied.  See Lee, supra 
note 50, at 522–31.  
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implicit, “resonate[s] with juries that harbor biases, misinformation, or 
confusion about transgendered individuals.”87
As a legal matter, the trans panic defense fails to prove that 
transgender victims offer legally adequate provocation; indeed, the “sexual 
deception” alleged in nearly all trans panic defenses is not culpable under 
most states’ rape laws.
 
88
V. TRANS PANIC AS INADEQUATE PROVOCATION 
  Additionally, rejecting the trans panic defense 
comports with a principled commitment to recognize the autonomy of 
individuals with respect to their gender.  Ensuring that the trans panic 
defense is no longer welcome anywhere in the United States will require a 
wide range of strategies: legislative enactments in some states, judicial 
action in others, and aggressive action by prosecutors everywhere. 
The unfortunate fact is that trans panic sometimes works in the 
courtroom.  Perhaps the most egregious example of an explicit and 
successful trans panic defense is the 1997 trial of William Palmer, who, 
after meeting Chanelle Pickett in a bar, beat and choked her for eight 
minutes, killing her.89  The jury acquitted Palmer of the three more serious 
charges—first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary 
manslaughter—finding him guilty only of assault and battery.90  Thus 
Palmer, who claimed that he reacted to Pickett’s anatomical sex being 
revealed, was convicted only for attacking Pickett, not killing her.91  As 
transgender activist Nancy Nangeroni said at the time, “It really speaks to 
the fact that being transsexual means being less of a person . . . .  Rich, 
white boy kills poor black transsexual girl, and the white boy gets a slap on 
the wrist.”92
 
87 Steinberg, supra note 
 
76, at 521. 
88 Cf. Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 830–31 (1988). 
89 Francie Latour, Sibling Decries Murder Acquittal; Verdict is Assault in Transsexual’s 
Death, BOS. GLOBE, May 3, 1997, at B1. 
90 Id. 
91 Id.  Palmer’s lawyers suggested that he did not kill Pickett, and that she died, instead, 
of a cocaine overdose.  The medical examiner refuted that speculation, testifying that “the 
levels of cocaine found in [Pickett’s] body were too low to have contributed significantly to 
[her] death.”  Id. 
92 Id.  Nangeroni’s blunt but truthful assessment of the Palmer trial recognizes that race, 
ethnicity, and class are always intertwined with sex, gender, and gender identity.  Angie 
Zapata was an Hispanic trans woman killed by a white man, for example.  The ties between 
sex and gender markers, on one hand, and race, ethnicity and class, on the other, are beyond 
the scope of this Comment, however. 
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While the reduction in sentence achieved by Palmer is more dramatic 
than in many other uses of the trans panic defense,93 the outlines of his 
defense are similar to those which still occur.  His three-year sentence is an 
outlier, but any mitigation is a boon to a defendant facing a murder 
charge.94
Although they have been effective in the courtroom, trans panic 
defenses fail to assert a legally sufficient provocation, and thus should be 
rejected at trial.  Courts generally allow mitigation defenses only in cases 
where the facts support a cognizable and legally adequate claim of 
provocation.
  Securing even an outside chance to be convicted of manslaughter 
rather than murder would be a success for a defendant facing evidence like 
that presented against Angie Zapata’s killer. 
95
The trans panic defense seeks to assert that the transgender victim 
provoked a murderous attack on him- or herself.  There are two possible 
routes for making this claim: a claim of justification
  All varieties of the trans panic defense fail to prove that the 
defendant was provoked in a way that is cognizable as legally sufficient. 
96 or a claim of 
excuse.97  Reviewing the history of provocation defenses, Professor 
Dressler points out, “All of the common law forms of ‘adequate 
provocation’ have one thing in common; they all involve unlawful conduct 
by the provoker.”98  These categories originally included finding a spouse 
committing adultery in delicto and seeing a friend or family member being 
assaulted.99
 
93 Angie Zapata’s killer was convicted of first-degree murder, and the killers of Gwen 
Araujo of manslaughter.  Dunn, supra note 
  In contrast, contemporary understandings of provocation are 
based in an objective consideration of the defendant’s mental state.  Modern 
31; Henry K. Lee, 2 Guilty in 2nd Degree in 
Araujo Slaying, S. F. CHRON. Sept. 13, 2005, at A1. 
94 Latour, supra note 89, at B1. 
95 See generally Dressler, supra note 45, at 429–32. 
96 See generally Note, Manslaughter and the Adequacy of Provocation: The 
Reasonableness of the Reasonable Man, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1024–36 (1958) 
(exploring the common law analysis underlying traditional categories of sufficient 
provocation). 
97 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (2001) (explaining that “extreme  mental or 
emotional disturbance” which influence a killer can mitigate murder to manslaughter); see, 
e.g., Crane v. State, 685 S.E.2d 314, 317 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that “engaging 
[defendant] in a dangerous road race and threatening to kill him; throwing an object at 
[defendant’s] truck; . . . forcibly striking the window two or three times; and taunting 
[defendant] to shoot . . . supplied sufficient provocation to excite the passion necessary for 
voluntary manslaughter”). 
98 Dressler, supra note 45, at 439.  Adultery has been decriminalized, so perhaps a more 
accurate reading is historically unlawful behavior gives rise to adequate provocation. 
99 Id.  See also Regina v. Mawgridge, Kel. J. 119, 128, reprinted in 84 Eng. Rep. 1107, 
1111 (Q.B. 1707) (finding that throwing a bottle at accused was not adequate provocation 
because it was “justifiable and lawful”). 
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provocation doctrine places the reasonable man in the defendant’s situation 
and asks whether the reasonable man would be provoked.100  In both cases, 
however, the primary consideration is objective: would a reasonable person 
be adequately provoked to kill?101
Trans panic defenses often leave the exact provocation unstated, but 
the defense seems to break down into three possible “triggers,” each of 
which could constitute the source of adequate provocation: (1) the victim’s 
anatomical sex, (2) the revelation of the victim’s anatomical sex, and (3) the 
victim’s alleged act of “sexual deception.”
 
102
A. ANATOMICAL SEX 
  None of these three triggers 
constitutes legally adequate provocation. 
The first alleged trigger for the trans panic defense is the difference 
between the victim’s anatomical sex and gender presentation.  Claiming this 
difference as the basis for adequate provocation does not meet the general 
requirement that the victim act in provoking a murderous reaction.103  
Araujo’s killer implicitly claimed that Araujo’s identity—that of a person 
who felt herself female despite having male genitalia—was in and of itself 
sufficient to provoke a response.104  This claim moves beyond the 
mainstream of provocation law to baldly state that transgender people’s 
anatomical sex qua sex is provocation without any action.105
 
100 See generally Dressler, supra note 
 
45.  Some states and the Model Penal Code add a 
secondary subjective consideration; they place the reasonable man in the defendant’s 
situation as he saw it and ask if the provocation was sufficient.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 632(2) (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-702 (2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-103; UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-205.5(4) (2009); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (2001). 
101 For both approaches, the threshold issue is whether provocation was legally 
sufficient.  The difference is in how that threshold is crossed—by a specific occurrence 
(under the common law approach) or by the determination of the defendant’s state of mind 
(under the MPC approach). 
102 Steinberg, supra note 76, at 508. 
103 MARTHA NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY 128–29 (2004). 
104 See Steinberg, supra note 76, at 509. 
105 It might alternatively be claimed that the juxtaposition of sex and gender presented to 
the killer is the source of claimed provocation.  To view the trigger in this way may not 
accurately reflect the whole of trans identity, but in either case, the claimed provocation is 
inherent to the trans victim.  Whether the killer claims that he (or she) was provoked by the 
victim’s sex or its contrast with the victim’s gender presentation, the victim does nothing to 
the killer.  Only by claiming that transgender identity is a form of deception at all times 
could the killer argue that his (or her) victim did anything to provoke a murderous rage.  This 
argument, while undoubtedly intelligible, must be rejected if transgender people are taken as 
acceptable in society. 
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The implications of accepting transgender people’s anatomical sex as 
provocation are broad and troubling.  As Victoria L. Steinberg writes, “To 
expand the definition of sufficient provocation to include a person’s 
characteristics would open the door to justifying mitigation for murder of 
anyone that a killer . . . dislikes, feels uncomfortable interacting with, or 
finds disgusting.”106  If distaste or disapproval of a person’s gender identity 
is sufficient to excuse murder by the provocation defense, then other kinds 
of strong disapproval may also justify a provocation defense.  In the past, 
claims of provocation with their roots in disgust of Jews, African 
Americans, or the physically handicapped were regularly accepted.107  
Today, however, such defenses are found to be morally repugnant and are 
not admitted in court.108  Rejection of claims of provocation by 
“Jewishness” or race flows from a recognition that such provocation stems 
not from reason but from prejudice; the reasonable person is generally taken 
to represent our better urges as a society, not just as a representation of the 
feelings of an “ordinary” person.109
Here, some point to hate crimes laws that express society’s disapproval 
as implying that courts must reject gay panic defenses.
 
110  The federal hate 
crimes law, enacted in 2009, is important as a statement of principle, but 
does not alone overcome the persistence of the trans panic defense.  In New 
York, Dwight DeLee was prosecuted under hate crime statutes for the 
killing of LaTeisha Green, a trans woman, but was only found guilty of 
manslaughter, not murder.111
 
106 Steinberg, supra note 
  Green was at a house party with her brother, 
76, at 508. 
107 NUSSBAUM, supra note 103, at 134. 
108 Id. 
109 Lee, supra note 50, at 506.  This argument encapsulates the force of history that 
mitigates in favor of ending use of the trans panic defenses. 
110 Scott D. McCoy, Note, The Homosexual-Advance Defense and Hate Crimes Statutes: 
Their Interaction and Conflict, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 629 (2001) (arguing that allowing gay 
panic defenses is philosophically inconsistent with a hate crime law which expresses societal 
sentiment that crimes motivated by sexual orientation are in some way more culpable than 
the same criminal act without prejudice as a motivating factor).  McCoy does not address 
trans panic defenses, but his logic seems to easily extend to hate crimes laws which are 
inclusive of gender identity. 
111 Jim O’Hara, Hate-Crime Killer Receives 25-Year Term, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, 
N.Y.), August 19, 2009, at A6.  There is a tortured logic to the coexistence of gay or trans 
panic defenses and hate crimes laws.  The combination recognizes the historic prejudice 
faced by LGBT people while also recognizing a diminished mental state—the very purpose 
claimed for provocation defenses.  In essence, DeLee’s conviction says: We understand that 
he acted under extreme emotional disturbance which was a response to Green’s gender 
identity or sexuality and thus cannot hold him accountable for murder, but we also find his 
disgust antisocial and want to combat it by enhancing his manslaughter penalty. 
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where several other guests shouted homophobic slurs at her.  Later, she was 
outside the party in a car with her brother when DeLee approached the car 
and fired a single shot from a .22-caliber rifle, killing her.112  New York has 
a hate crimes law that includes sexual orientation, but does not cover gender 
identity.113  Prosecutors successfully contended that, because of the 
homophobic slurs, the killing was related to Green’s sexuality and tried the 
case as a hate crime.114  The case was only the second in the United States 
in which hate crimes statutes were used in the prosecution of a crime 
against a transgender person.115
Many of the trans panic defenses documented in the media claim that 
the killer was provoked by the transgender victim’s anatomical sex.  
Allowing transgender people’s existence—which inherently includes 
inconsistency between gender and anatomical sex—to constitute adequate 
provocation is counter to the general requirement that provocation be an 
affirmative act by the victim
 
116
B. REVELATION OF ANATOMICAL SEX 
 and opens the door to other characteristic-
motivated provocation defenses.  The claim that transgender people’s 
anatomical sex is a provocation has no legal validity; the victim does 
nothing to provoke a response, let alone a murderous one. 
Defendants using a trans panic defense often claim, whether implicitly 
or explicitly, that the victim’s revelation of his or her anatomical sex—
which does not strictly conform with his or her gender presentation—
constitutes adequate provocation.  Known cases do not include such 
revelations, and even were a revelation to occur, it would constitute a 
speech act that courts ought to protect, not cast as provocation.117  In the 
cases considered here, the victims did not proactively reveal their own 
anatomical sex to their killers.  Angie Zapata pointedly refused to answer 
questions about her anatomical sex and Allen Andrade groped her to 
confirm his suspicion that she had a penis.118
 
 It is not clear from limited media coverage whether DeLee’s attorneys made any explicit 
trans panic claims in his defense, but the situation is certainly one in which LaTeisha 
Green’s gender identity could subconsciously influence jurors in deciding on which charge 
to convict. 
  The “revelation” in the 
112 Linthicum, supra note 75, at A11. 
113 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05 (McKinney 2009). 
114 Linthicum, supra note 75, at A11. 
115 Id. 
116 NUSSBAUM, supra note 103, at 128–29. 
117 See infra text accompanying notes 121–124. 
118 See supra text accompanying notes 15–17. 
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Araujo case was even less voluntary: “[T]he defendants harassed Araujo to 
determine her sex, ultimately throwing her to the ground and pulling off her 
clothing to reveal her genitals.”119  If, for purposes of argument, a 
transgender person’s affirmative revelation of anatomical sex could 
constitute adequate provocation, that situation has yet to arise in a 
publicized case.120
Even in the hypothetical situation in which a transgender person 
affirmatively reveals his or her anatomical sex and thereby contributes to 
another person’s murderous rage, that revelation should not constitute 
adequate provocation.  Instead, it should be read as a speech act—what Nan 
Hunter calls “expressive identity.”
 
121  Conceived of as speech, the 
revelation of a transgender person’s anatomical sex becomes political as 
well as personal.122  Political statements are generally not read as adequate 
provocation, unless they also incorporate fighting words.123
 
119 Steinberg, supra note 
  Indeed, were a 
court to allow the mere statement that one’s gender and anatomical sex do 
76, at 509. 
120 Recognizing that truth is often stranger than fiction, this Comment does not suggest 
such a situation is impossible—merely improbable.  Trans people are generally cautious 
about revealing such information casually, and for good reason.  Transgender people were 
the victims of 12% of bias crimes against the LGBT community in 2007.  NAT'L COALITION 
OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, HATE VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND 
TRANSGENDER PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2008), available at http://www.ncavp.org/ 
common/document_files/Reports/2008 HV Report smaller file.pdf.  Other considerations 
suggest that, were such an improbability to occur, that such a revelation would still not 
constitute adequate provocation.  See infra Part V.C. 
121 Nan Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1 (2000) (arguing that for groups whose identity is central to a political claim—
for example, transgender people claiming equal protection—there is case law suggesting that 
identity itself is expressive speech).   
 Are transgender people’s identities intentional enough to constitute expressive speech?  It 
has never been tested at trial or on appeal, but a well-developed identity politics, recognizing 
the inherently political nature of personal status,suggests that they may be.  Further 
consideration of this issue is well outside the scope of this Comment, however. 
122 Id. at 4–6. 
123 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 562 (1942) (“There are certain 
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 
which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.  These include . . . 
‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace.”).  A statement like those envisioned as constituting 
provocation here—“I am transgender,” or “I may appear female to you but I have male 
genitalia”—does not analogize to well-known fighting words, which directly insult the 
listener.  In Cohen v. California, the Supreme Court limited the reach of “fighting words” by 
requiring that they “could reasonably have [been] regarded . . . as a direct personal insult” or 
as “intentionally provoking a given group to hostile reaction.”  403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).  
Statements of transgender identity are far from this standard, however it might be 
interpreted. 
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not align in the typical way to serve as adequate provocation, essentially, it 
would be declaring that all openly transgender people provoke the 
reasonable person to a murderous rage merely by their existence.124
Past cases suggest that defendants seeking to use the trans panic 
defense proactively seek out information regarding their victims’ 
anatomical sex, rendering the revelation of that information inadequate 
provocation because the victim does not act towards the defendant.  Even 
were there to be a situation in which a transgender person revealed their 
anatomical sex and was killed as a result, considerations of speech and 
identity politics suggest that the only just response would be for courts to 
find the genital revelation inadequate provocation. 
 
Claims that the anatomical sex of a transgender person constitutes 
adequate provocation fail because the victim does not act.  Recognizing a 
person’s innate or chosen characteristics as legally cognizable adequate 
provocation leads to an absurd and undesirable result: the 
institutionalization of bias as legitimization for violent crime.  Even if the 
argument attempts to shift the alleged provocation from a transgender 
person’s existence to his or her revelation of their gender identity, the same 
concerns apply; recognizing the revelation of one’s transgender status as 
adequate provocation makes living as a transgender person adequate 
provocation as well.  The allegation that a transgender person’s “sexual 
deception” constitutes adequate provocation, however, is not so obviously 
deficient.  It offers perhaps the most viable path to a successful provocation 
defense in trans panic cases, although it fails just as claims stemming from 
the victim’s gender identity do. 
C. SEXUAL DECEPTION 
The third and ultimate legal claim made in trans panic defenses is that 
the transgender victim committed a vaguely defined sexual fraud in failing 
to reveal their anatomical sex to the defendant.125  This fraud allegedly 
provides the adequate provocation that substantiates the trans panic defense 
and secures mitigation to manslaughter.  The defendants accused of 
murdering Angie Zapata and Gwen Aruajo both explicitly claimed that they 
had been deceived.126
 
124 This Comment cannot and does not prove the political import of transgender people’s 
existence.  However, combating the trans panic defense is an inherently political act, 
concerned with society’s understanding of gender identity and its respect for that identity.  
Making political claims may be difficult, but is unavoidable when making identity-based 
arguments, as here.  Hunter, supra note 
  The alleged deception was crucial for the 
121, at 4–6. 
125 Steinberg, supra note 76, at 510–11. 
126 See supra text accompanying notes 22–24, 80–81. 
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provocation claimed by these male defendants.  From their perspective, 
sexual intimacy with a person perceived as female was acceptable, but 
sexual intimacy with anyone with male anatomical sex characteristics was 
an affront sufficient to provoke a homicidal rage.127
Allegations of fraud are serious business, and they arise surprisingly 
frequently in other sexual contexts.
  Being induced into a 
sexual act by a person they perceive as female (but who is, for them, 
“actually” male because of anatomical sex) is the alleged trigger for 
adequate provocation. 
128  To substantiate the claim of adequate 
provocation by sexual deception or sexual fraud129 central to the trans panic 
defense, defendants must first show that there is in fact fraud, and second, 
they must demonstrate that the fraud alleged is legally blameworthy.130
The claim of fraud presupposes the existence of a “material fact that 
one has a duty to reveal” and harm done by a misrepresentation of that 
fact.
  As 
this section will demonstrate, neither fraud nor deception as alleged in the 
trans panic defense constitute legally adequate provocation. 
131  For the claims made about sexual misrepresentation in the trans 
panic defense to constitute fraud, both the transgender person’s gender and 
anatomical sex must be material to the decision to engage in the sexual act, 
and the transgender person must have a duty to reveal that fact to their 
killer.132
A person’s anatomical sex is not a material fact capable of being 
misrepresented in most sexual relationships, including those which give rise 
  Since neither of these propositions is true, as argued below, it 
follows that there is no sexual fraud or deception when a transgender person 
does not reveal their anatomical sex to a sexual partner. 
 
127 In the one well-documented case involving a transgender man, Brandon Teena, the 
claims of the defendants are much less clear; they were accused of raping Teena in the weeks 
preceding his death, and records of their exact defenses in court are scant.  See Worthington, 
supra note 74, at TEMPO-1. 
128 See Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39, 49 
(1998) (reviewing the legal treatment of deception across a broad spectrum of sexual 
encounters). 
129 The distinction between sexual fraud and sexual misrepresentation is blurry at best.  
Since much of the contemporary application of the trans panic defense is at the level of 
appealing to bias rather than legal argumentation, the precise distinction does not affect the 
analysis that follows.  Deception, misrepresentation, and fraud are, in this context, 
interchangeable. 
130 Cf. Chamallas, supra note 88, at 830–33 (suggesting that rape by fraud is not 
prosecuted because courts are reluctant to become judges of which frauds are material to 
consent and because “the man who lies to get his way is less blameworthy than one who 
resorts to physical force”). 
131 Steinberg, supra note 76, at 511. 
132 Id. 
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to assertions of the trans panic defense.  Either the transgender person’s 
genitals are irrelevant to the sexual act or acts that occur, or the transgender 
person’s genitals are exposed to his or her sexual partner in the course of 
sex acts.  In neither the Zapata nor the Araujo case was there genital-to-
genital contact or even exposure of the transgender person’s genitals.133
The trans panic defense necessarily implies that transgender people 
deceive their sexual partners even when the transgender person’s genitals 
are not involved in the sexual act.  This “leads inevitably to the conclusion 
that a person has a duty to reveal their genitals, or verbally communicate the 
nature of their biological sex to one with whom they are intimate.”
  
Although people may make assumptions about the anatomical sex of those 
with whom they have sexual interactions that do not involve genital contact, 
the anatomical sex of an oral sex partner, for example, is immaterial to the 
contemplated sex act.  Either the sexual act is consummated without both 
parties’ genitals being involved—as is frequently the case when oral sex is 
performed on a male, where the female (or trans woman’s) genitals are not 
involved in the act—or the sexual act involves genital contact, in which 
case no deception regarding anatomical sex is possible because the genitals 
of both participants are exposed. 
134  One 
of the defendants in the Araujo case made just such a claim: “[A] 
heterosexual male has a right to . . . choose the gender of his partners . . . 
Eddie [Gwen] Araujo took away that choice by deception.”135  Leaving 
aside the fact that Gwen Araujo’s gender was female, one party’s 
preferences do not impose any obligation on others to voluntarily disclose 
their anatomical sex, any more than a person is obligated to disclose any 
other relevant genital characteristic.  For example, although this seems 
likely to be less important today than in the past,136 society persists in 
valuing female virginity.137
 
133 Andrade claimed that he received oral sex from Zapata, but no other sexual contact, 
including any where Zapata’s genitals would be touched or even visible, occurred.  See 
Correll, supra note 
  Despite that subjective value, the condition of a 
3, at A3.  One juror recounted that Araujo had anal sex with her killers.  
Brian Kluepfel, Left Hanging, EAST BAY EXPRESS (May 11, 2005), 
http://www.eastbayexpress.com/eastbay/left-hanging/Content?oid=1077790.  She also 
insisted that her genitals not be touched during sexual acts.  Haddock, supra note 80, at E1. 
134 Steinberg, supra note 76, at 511. 
135 Kelly St. John, Nature of Killing Focus at End of Araujo Case, S. F. CHRON., June 1, 
2004, at B1. 
136 See, e.g., David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 465–66 
(2000) (noting that seduction in breach of promise to marry, a crime which was in part 
defined by the loss of the female’s virginity, “probably has become much less common” in 
contemporary America). 
137 See, e.g., DANIEL L. CHEN, GENDER VIOLENCE AND THE PRICE OF VIRGINITY: THEORY 
AND EVIDENCE OF INCOMPLETE MARRIAGE CONTRACTS 2 (2005), available at 
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woman’s hymen, which is commonly but erroneously perceived as a 
signifier of her virginity,138 would not constitute adequate provocation even 
if that condition did not align with her professed virginity.139  Further, were 
courts to implicitly impose such a standard by finding that failure to reveal 
one’s anatomical sex constituted adequate provocation, it would encounter 
substantial difficulties in defining sex.140
Courts have been hesitant to intrude into the historically private zone 
of consensual sexual interactions when considering claims of fraud.
 
141  
They have refused to consider fraud or misrepresentation regarding birth 
control use142 and prior homosexual experience.143
In considering the intersection of fraud, misrepresentation, deception, 
and sex, rape law offers a rich source of legal theory.  There may be a trend 
towards greater acceptance of tort claims arising from deception in intimate 
relationships, but the criminal law is much less open to claims of rape by 
fraud.
  The existing policy 
seems both practical and wise; the creation of judicial standards for 
revealing personal information in the context of romantic or sexual relations 
is fraught with difficulty.  Because a person’s anatomical sex is not material 
information prior to genital contact, at which point a person’s anatomical 
sex is necessarily revealed, failure by a transgender person to disclose their 
anatomical sex cannot be legally recognized as fraud.  Nor is there any duty 
to give notice about one’s genitals. 
144
 
http://home.uchicago.edu/~dlc/papers/GenderViolence_PriceOfVirginity.pdf (noting that 
asymmetrical values of virginity, which place a greater value on female virginity, persist 
across time and income changes). 
  There are several general situations, however, in which fraud used 
to secure consent is legally culpable: fraudulent medical treatment, fraud as 
138 Cf. SALLY E. PERLMAN ET AL., CLINICAL PROTOCOLS IN PEDIATRIC AND ADOLESCENT 
GYNECOLOGY 131 (2004). 
139 While the concept of rape by fraud or deception perpetrated by women has 
undoubtedly not received the same degree of attention as that perpetrated by males, 
Professor Falk’s survey of cases of rape by fraud does not mention virginity.  Falk, supra 
note 128, at 49–76 (collecting a representative selection of cases where convictions were 
obtained for rape by fraud). 
140 Although the popular conception of sex is of a binary, male–female divide, the reality 
is much more complicated.  There are intersex people, who are born with some male and 
some female characteristics, as well as those with non-standard chromosomes.  What to 
disclose, and how, would be a major problem.  See generally Greenberg, supra note 39. 
141 Steinberg, supra note 76, at 512. 
142 Id. (citing Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) 
(rejecting a misrepresentation claim about the use of birth control)). 
143 See Woy v. Woy, 737 S.W.2d 769, 773–74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (finding wife had no 
duty to reveal lesbian sexual activity engaged in prior to heterosexual marriage). 
144 Chamallas, supra note 88, at 830–31. 
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to the defendant’s identity, and sexual scams involving sex as a means to 
secure a career (usually in entertainment).145  Each of these categories is 
connected by a theory of “fraud in the factum,” where the victim is 
deceived as to the nature of the act.146  If these fact patterns appeared in 
sexual relationships in which a transgender person commits fraud, the 
victim would have a justified claim of sexual fraud which would constitute 
adequate provocation.  A transgender doctor who induces consent by 
pretending to be offering medical treatment while in fact committing a sex 
act would be guilty of rape by fraud.147  This scenario, however, bears no 
resemblance to the fact patterns that lead to the trans panic defense.  Merely 
failing to disclose anatomical sex is not fraud in the factum.148
The claims of “sexual deception” made by defendants asserting a trans 
panic defense bear more resemblance to the theoretical concept of fraud in 
the inducement than they do to fraud in the factum.  From the killer’s 
perspective, a transgender victim may have induced consent to a sexual 
encounter through deception about their anatomical sex.
 
149  As Martha 
Chamallas succinctly explains, however, “[f]alse promises of marriage, 
false representations of sterility, or false professions of love will not vitiate 
the deceived party’s consent, even if the consenting party would never have 
agreed to the encounter if the truth were told.”150  Even if one accepts that a 
transgender person does deceive a sexual partner about his or her 
anatomical sex, the consent obtained thereby would be valid because the 
transgender person’s genitals are not integral to consent for sex acts that do 
not involve those genitals.151
 
145 Falk, supra note 
  Anatomical sex is not involved in consent to 
128, at 49–76 (collecting a representative selection of cases where 
convictions were obtained for rape by fraud). 
146 Chamallas, supra note 88, at 831 n.224.  “Fraud in the factum typically denotes a 
situation in which the victim consents to the doing of act X and the perpetrator of the fraud, 
in the guise of doing act X, actually does act Y.”  Id. 
147 Fraudulent medical treatment is perhaps an archetype of rape by fraud.  See generally 
Falk, supra note 128, at 52–58 (outlining cases of rape by doctors achieved through fraud). 
148 Consenting to “sex act X with a woman” rather than “sex act X with a trans woman 
who possesses male genitals” would not be fraud in the factum, however discordant it might 
be for a presumably heterosexual person.  Fraud in the factum is focused on lack of consent 
to the sex act.  If a man (or woman) consented to a sex act with a transgender person, the 
anatomical sex of the transgender person is irrelevant for considerations of fraud in the 
factum. 
149 Indeed, Andrade and Araujo’s killers both made similar claims.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 22–24, 79. 
150 Chamallas, supra note 88, at 832. 
151 ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 215 (3d ed. 1982) 
(“[C]onsent induced by fraud is as effective as any other consent . . . if the deception relates 
not to the thing done but merely to some collateral matter . . . .”).  For example, if a man 
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non-genital sex acts, and sex acts involving a transgender person’s genitals 
would necessarily disclose the nature of those genitals.  Given the 
immateriality of anatomical sex to consent for non-genital sex acts, the lack 
of duty to disclose anatomical sex generally, and the well-established rape 
law principle that misrepresentation is not generally legally culpable, the 
trans panic defense does not demonstrate that “sexual deception” or “sexual 
fraud” is adequate provocation.  Instead, it merely demonstrates the 
obvious—that sexual relations are complicated.152
There is one serious scholarly defense of what is essentially a 
provocation by rape claim in trans panic defenses.  In expounding a theory 
of provocation based on sexual misrepresentation, Bradford Bigler puts 
forth a three-part test for determining when sexual misrepresentation is 
legally cognizable as provocation: first, the defendant and victim must have 
engaged in sexual activity; second, the misrepresentation must obscure a 
fact which would be material to consent; and third, the misrepresented fact 
would “be likely to cause a reasonable person a severe mental or emotional 
crisis upon discovery.”
 
153  He argues that the triggering provocation in 
cases where rape leads to a heat of passion is the lack of consent.154
 
consents to receive oral sex from a trans woman, her transgender identity does not impact his 
consent to oral sex.  His consent is not voided by the fact that he was deceived about 
something unrelated to the act, including the anatomical sex of his partner. 
 
152 Professors Falk and Chamallas are critical from a feminist perspective of rigid or rote 
application of the distinction between fraud in the factum and fraud in the inducement.  Falk, 
supra note 128, at 171–72; Chamallas, supra note 88, at 832.  Professor Falk summarizes 
this objection, writing, “Diversity of opinion [exists] regarding the appropriate parameters of 
legally effective consent in cases of rape by fraud.”  She explains that “commentators’ 
suggestions . . . are more expansive than the traditional factum-inducement dichotomy and, 
thereby, offer greater protection to potential victims.”  Falk, supra note 128, at 171.  
Following this line of reasoning to one possible extreme leads to Bigler’s conclusions 
regarding sexual deception.  See infra text accompanying notes 153–159.  Following this 
line of reasoning while criticizing the heterosexual privilege and male privilege inherent in 
claims of trans panic might suggest rejecting claims of trans panic despite skepticism of the 
“factum-inducement dichotomy”.  Falk suggests defining rape by fraud starting from the 
“coerciveness of fraud.”  Falk, supra note 128, at 171–72.  It is not clear whether or not the 
specific facts of any trans panic claim would constitute coercive fraud after this redefinition 
of rape.  In any case, these theoretical considerations do not represent the current state of 
rape law.  Further analysis along these lines is outside the scope of this Comment. 
153 Bigler, supra note 83, at 820.  The author concedes the great difficulty of defining a 
“sexual act” and leaves such determination to a case-by-case fact-finding outside the scope 
of the comment.  Id at 821. 
154 Id. at 823.  This seems to be right on its face; the presence or absence of force in a 
sexual act does not, in itself, render the act “bad” or morally reprehensible.  Id. at 823 n. 181. 
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Starting with the premise that sexual acts obtained by fraud ought to be 
legally culpable,155 the argument then generalizes from rape law to sexual 
misrepresentation.156  According to Bigler, “[s]exual identity cases . . . seem 
to straddle fraud in the inducement and fraud in fact.”157  On one hand, the 
defendant consented to a sex act, which was then consummated; Bigler 
suggests this is fraud in inducement.  On the other hand, Bigler writes, 
“[T]he nature of the sex to which the deceived party consents (for example, 
heterosexual sodomy in the case of Araujo) is fundamentally different than 
the act in which the defendant actually engaged (here, homosexual 
sodomy);” he suggests this is fraud in the factum.158  In order for there to be 
more than fraud in the inducement—for Bigler’s thesis to hold—
transgender people must be legally defined by their anatomical sex rather 
than their self-identified gender.  In short, Allen Andrade’s attorneys must 
have been correct when they referred to Angie Zapata as Justin.159
The crux of both Bigler’s theory of sexual misrepresentation and of the 
trans panic defense is that transgender people cannot escape their birth sex.  
Birth sex, however, is not as clear as the lay observer might believe.  
“Recent medical literature indicates that approximately one to four percent 
of the world’s population may be intersexed and have either ambiguous or 
noncongruent sex features.”
 
160  Even if it were advisable to use the courts to 
mandate disclosure of anatomical sex, this minority of people would be at 
risk; a disgruntled sexual partner could point to “ambiguous or 
noncongruent sex features” and claim they had been deceived regarding the 
“true” biological sex of their intersex partner.  Further, the argument that a 
transgender person is defined not by their gender but by their anatomical 
sex denies their experience and even their personhood.161
 
155 Id. at 823 n.183 (citing criticisms of rape law, including Falk, supra note 
  Additionally, by 
arguing for a genital-based provocation, both trans panic defenses and the 
128, for the 
proposition that obtaining consent by fraud should be morally culpable). 
156 If, as the theory of rape by fraud asserts, obtaining consent based on a material 
misrepresentation is rape, then some of the categories of misrepresentation (“sexual identity” 
and “sexual health”) constitute adequate provocation insofar as they are, actually, categories 
of rape.  This implication, however, is left unexplored.  See id. at 820–30. 
157 Id. at 800. 
158 Id. at 800–01. 
159 Dunn, supra note 2. 
160 Greenberg, supra note 39, at 267. 
161 See generally Hasan Shafiqullah, Shape-shifters, Masqueraders, & Subversives: An 
Argument for the Liberation of Transgendered Individuals, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 195 
(1997) (arguing that the law should support self-actualization by trans people). 
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theory of sexual misrepresentation privilege one form of gender 
identification—anatomical sex—over many others.162
VI. GENDER AUTONOMY AND THE TRANS PANIC DEFENSE 
 
The government assigns legal gender or sex to people at birth.  The sex 
recorded on a birth certificate is a powerful identifier and follows people 
through life.  It is so important that some courts have refused to grant 
changes even in the face of evidence that the original attribution was 
incorrect.163  There is broad agreement that some uses of a government-
maintained gender classification are legitimate while others are not; police 
officers and firefighters are now judged on merit rather than gender, while 
compulsory draft registration and the right to marry are still based on 
meeting specific gender restrictions.164  As Professor Weiss argues, 
“[T]ransexual people insist that they have the need and the right to 
determine their own gender.”165  She asserts a privacy claim on behalf of 
transgender people not just for Brandeis’s famous “right to be let alone,”166 
but also as for the right to exist as autonomous sexual beings.167
 
162 Jillian Todd Weiss diagnoses the complexity inherent to perceptions of gender: 
  A 
meaningful right to privacy confers on individuals the right to define their 
own gender.  This “undoubtedly raises administrative problems for the legal 
systems . . . .  However, it is no answer to say that administrative 
convenience is superior to personhood, that since we cannot fit these 
transsexual people into our pet theory of gender, they must accommodate 
There are many markers of gender, and of these, genitalia is the least significant for purposes of 
daily functioning in society.  Our perception of gender . . . is based on a conglomeration of 
numerous factors, including but not limited to visual cues such as gait, body and facial 
characteristics, body language, and dress; auditory cues such as voice and vocabulary; and 
cultural cues such as interpersonal style, profession, job title, social status, and economic status.  
If there is a greater number of factors associated with femininity, we see a female, if there is a 
greater number of factors indicating masculinity, we see a male. 
Weiss, supra note 41, at 179. 
163 Id. at 167 n.139. 
164 Id. at 168.  The strict gender boundaries erected around marriage may be slowly 
crumbling, but the vast majority of Americans are still restricted from marrying any person 
who is not legally considered to be of the opposite sex. 
165 Id. 
166 Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
167 Weiss, supra note 41, at 169–70.  As Professor Weiss writes, “Privacy does not reside 
in our actions, but in our selves.  A ‘private’ life refers to the idea that each of us has our 
own individual, i.e., private, self, which we are allowed to create as we will, within the 
strictures of proper government power,” and which cannot be otherwise abridged by the 
polity.  Id. at 170.  
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their identity to our . . . notions of reality.”168
VII. RESPONDING TO TRANS PANIC IN THE COURTROOM 
  Exposing transgender people 
to the risk of mitigation by trans panic as a consequence of their 
actualization of deeply held gender identities is an unfair, cruel burden to 
place upon a group which already suffers under the burden of transphobia 
and homophobia. 
Faced with the legally insufficient, morally suspect trans panic 
defense, what is to be done?  There are two major responses available to 
combat the trans panic defense: legislative bans or changes to jury 
instructions.  Critics of the gay panic defense have largely called for it to be 
judicially or legislatively banned.169  Following this prohibitory instinct, 
California became the first state in the nation to ban “panic” defenses based 
in homophobia or transphobia in 2006.170  The statute, A.B. 1160,171 is 
simple but powerful; it codifies disapproval of panic defenses.172
In any criminal trial or proceeding, upon the request of a party, the court shall instruct 
the jury substantially as follows: “Do not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public 
opinion influence your decision.  Bias includes bias against the victim or victims, 
witnesses, or defendant based upon his or her disability, gender, nationality, race or 
ethnicity, religion, gender identity, or sexual orientation.
  
Specifically, it reads: 
173
Such a jury instruction “activates the notion of bias in the minds of the 
jurors, hopefully prompting them to examine the extent to which prejudice 




168 Id. at 181. 
  The combination of public policy 
disapproval of panic defenses and an affirmative instruction provides a 
strong disincentive against the use of trans panic defenses.  Legislative 
action like California’s has the advantage of “uniformity and 
169 See Lee, supra note 50, at 549–50.  “A critic of the gay panic defense might contend 
that the simplest way to deal with the problem would be for the legislature to pass a statute 
stating that a non-violent homosexual advance does not constitute legally adequate 
provocation.”  Id. 
170 Press Release, Transgender Law Center, Gwen Araujo Justice for Victims Act 
Becomes Law!, (September 28, 2006), available at http://transgenderlawcenter.org/ 
new/index.php/ updates/press-releases/gwen-araujo-justice-for-victims-act-becomes-law. 
171 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1127h (West 2010). 
172 Section 2(g) of A.B. 1160 reads: “It is against public policy for a defendant to be 
acquitted of a charged offense or convicted of a lesser included offense based upon an appeal 
to the societal bias that may be possessed by members of a jury.”  2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. 550 
(West). 
173 PENAL § 1127h. 
174 Annicchiarico, supra note 82, at 146. 
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consistency.”175  Additionally, there is no longer jury discretion to reduce 
verdicts unilaterally or an argument on appeal about the trial judge’s refusal 
to instruct on voluntary manslaughter.176  A legislative ban on the use of 
trans panic defenses has the additional salutary effect of signaling the 
polity’s opposition to the underlying arguments being made by potential 
defendants.177
In states where political forces prevent the adoption of a statute like 
A.B. 1160, it may still be possible to change jury instructions to combat 
trans panic defenses.  Existing jury instructions on provocation offer an 
invitation for jurors to insert their personal reaction to transgender people in 
the criminal justice system through use of the reasonable person standard.
 
178  
Open-ended “heat of passion” instructions also leave the door open for 
defense attorneys to prompt the subconscious biases of jurors.179  A 
potential solution is to instruct jurors that the reasonable person is one who 
“would not kill based on . . . transgender revelation.”180
Writing about gay panic defenses, Professor Cynthia Lee raises an 
important objection to simply banning explicit provocation defenses based 
on homosexual advances.  She argues that such bans are counterproductive.  
“Attempts to ban the argument . . . from the criminal courtroom will not 
work because defense attorneys will find more subtle ways to get the same 
idea across to the jury.”
  The adoption of 
these instructions, or others similar to them, across the country could 
dramatically reduce the use and effectiveness of the trans panic defense. 
181  Further, she points to research on race and 
implicit bias and argues that having gay panic defenses aired in the 
courtroom where the prosecution can aggressively counter them will 
produce less-biased outcomes than any legislative or judicial ban.182
While the danger from coded appeals to anti-gay or anti-trans bias is 
apparent, the either/or choice that is implicit in Professor Lee’s proposals 
for combating the gay panic defense seems to be false.  If defense attorneys 
attempt to use subtle triggers for jurors’ latent biases against transgender 
 
 
175 Lee, supra note 50, at 550. 
176 Annicchiarico, supra note 82, at 142. 
177 Id.  This would be a further statement in those states with transgender-inclusive hate 
crimes laws. 
178 For example, California’s instructions read: “The heat of passion which will reduce a 
homicide to manslaughter must be such a passion as would be aroused in the mind of an 
ordinarily reasonable person in the same circumstances.”  Cal. Jury Instructions, Criminal 
§ 8.42. 
179 Annicchiarico, supra note 82, at 145. 
180 Id. at 146.  
181 Lee, supra note 50, at 522. 
182 Id. at 536–49. 
2010] (TRANS)FORMING THE PROVOCATION DEFENSE 1687 
people, a legislative ban on trans panic defenses does not prevent 
prosecutors from responding.183  One common example of this subtle 
appeal to anti-trans bias was on display in the Angie Zapata trial; defense 
lawyers consistently attempted to remind juror of Angie’s earlier life as a 
boy.  Angie’s family consistently countered this tactic: “Family members 
and friends echoed repeatedly, ‘my sister,’ ‘Angie,’ one by one on the 
stand . . . as public defenders Annette Kundelius and Brad Martin 
questioned them about ‘Justin.’”184  The family’s response—using Angie’s 
name and female pronouns—is one effective response; jurors cannot help 
but identify with grieving family members, and those family members’ 
acceptance of Angie as transgender likely played a role in the first-degree 
murder conviction.  Prosecutors also actively countered bias-motivated 
arguments in their statements.185
Not every family will be as sympathetic as the Zapatas—many 
transgender people are still rejected by their families.  Prosecutors, 
however, are always present in the criminal courtroom and can play a 
critical role in combating trans panic defenses regardless of whether there is 
legislative action or new jury instructions for provocation.  Already, 
prosecutors have begun to educate each other on combating bias defenses; 
Fulton County, Georgia District Attorney Paul Howard hosted perhaps the 
first ever conference for prosecutors on responding to gay panic defenses.  
A year later, San Francisco District Attorney Kamala Harris hosted a 
similar conference, “Defeating the ‘Panic Defense’” at the Hastings College 
of Law in July 2006.
 
186
Removing trans panic defenses from American courtrooms will take a 
concerted effort by activists, lawyers, and citizens.  Where possible, 
legislative bans like that in California or jury instruction revisions should be 
made.  Even in the absence of political will at the state level, however, 
judges and prosecutors can work to ensure that cases in which they are 
involved are not decided based on a legally insufficient, morally suspect 
trans panic defense. 
 
 
183 Prosecutors in the Zapata trial were aggressive in countering explicit and implicit 
appeals to transphobia.  See supra text accompanying notes 25–30. 
184 Sharon Dunn, Angie Zapata’s Friends, Family Take the Stand, GREELEY TRIB. 
(Apr. 18, 2009), http://www.greeleytribune.com/article/20090418/NEWS/904189952. 
185 See supra text accompanying notes 25–30. 
186 Zak Szymanski, Harris Announces ‘Panic Defense’ Conference, BAY AREA REP. 
(Mar. 30, 2006), http://www.ebar.com/news/article.php?sec=news&article=690.  The San 
Francisco conference benefited from the presence of Alameda County Deputy District 
Attorney Chris Lamiero, who prosecuted Gwen Aruajo’s killers. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION: A RADICALLY INCLUSIVE PROVOCATION 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The trans panic defense, whether advanced in the courtroom or in legal 
academia, eventually rests on the false claim that a transgender victim is 
defined by their anatomical sex, irrespective of the gender that he or she felt 
inside.  In addition to being morally suspect, the trans panic defense lacks 
legal merit.  Neither a transgender person’s gender identity nor the 
revelation thereof constitutes adequate provocation for a mitigation defense.  
Similarly, a transgender person’s refusal to affirmatively disclose their 
anatomical sex—what defendants call fraud—does not constitute adequate 
provocation.  Finally, the trans panic defense constitutes a state-sanctioned 
injury to transgender people’s right of gender self-determination.  As a legal 
theory, the trans panic mitigation defense is indefensible and should be 
rejected. 
As transgender legal scholar Jillian Todd Weiss eloquently writes:  
There is a substantial and growing body of evidence supporting the theory that 
physical sex and psychological gender are not always congruent.  The transsexual 
citizens of our country, a substantial number of them, have turned their lives upside 
down because there is an incongruity between their physical sex and psychological 
gender.  Our law must reflect that reality.  The failure of the law to accord any 
meaning to the transsexual peoples’ claim is a theoretical model which denies their 
personhood, their essential humanity.187 
Since there is no legal ground to support the trans panic defense, the 
legal system is obligated to respect transgender victims of horrific violence.  
Whether through legislative action or zealous prosecution, states across 
America should follow California’s lead and work to consign the trans 
panic defense to the dustbin of history. 
 
187 Weiss, supra note 41, at 185–86. 
